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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“The actions by thousands of people . . . are in danger of making the law 
look an ass,” said John Whittingdale, chairman of the United Kingdom’s 
Commons culture committee.1  What exactly could inspire such a frank 
statement?  Social network sites like Facebook and Twitter.2  To understand 
why requires a look back to events during the summer of 2011, when a 
British soccer player, referred to in official records as “CTB,”3 sued News 
Group Newspapers (NGN) and former Big Brother contestant, Imogen 
Thomas (Thomas), in British courts.  His goal was to prevent the defendants 
from running a story regarding an alleged affair with Thomas.4  The claimant 
received an injunction but the information was released through a social 
network site, quickly rendering the injunction largely ineffective.5  Prior to 
the injunction, Thomas arranged several meetings with CTB at which she 
demanded a number of concessions.   
At first she requested 50,000 pounds sterling, which CTB refused to pay. 
At a subsequent meeting she demanded game tickets, which CTB did 
provide.6  He claimed that he accepted Thomas’s meetings for fear that she 
would sell her story otherwise.7  CTB then contacted Thomas to demand that 
she cease all contact with him, further offering to pay the previously 
requested sum.  However, Thomas increased the sum to 100,000 pounds 
sterling and warned CTB that journalists were near her home.8  Thomas 
contacted CTB one last time to say that a paper was ready to publish the 
story along with photos taken of them at the arranged meetings, though she 
denied knowing how these were obtained.9  At this point, CTB filed for the 
injunction, which Justice Eady ultimately granted,10 noting, among other 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Hélène Mulholland, Ryan Giggs Named as Footballer at the Centre of Privacy Row, THE 
GUARDIAN (May 23, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/may/23/ryan-giggs-
named-footballer-injunction-row. 
 2 Id.  
 3 CTB is a moniker the court used to refer to the claimant in order to protect his identity 
when court documents are released to the public.  For other examples of this practice see ETK 
v. News Grp. Newspapers, Ltd., [2011] EWCA (Civ) 439 and MNB v. News Grp. 
Newspapers, Ltd., [2011] EWHC (QB) 528 (Eng.). 
 4 CTB v. News Grp. Newspapers, Ltd., [2011] EWHC (QB) 1232, [1]–[2]. 
 5 Tweets About Super-Injunction Footballer Spike After Attempts to Gag Twitter, TELEGRAPH 
(May 22, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/twitter/8528823/Tweets-about-super-in 
junction-footballer-spike-after-attempts-to-gag-Twitter.html [hereinafter Tweets Spike]. 
 6 CTB, [2011] EWHC (QB) 1232 at [5]–[6]. 
 7 Id. at [5]. 
 8 Id. at [8]. 
 9 Id. at [10]. 
 10 See id. at [1], [16] (explaining that Justice Eady granted a temporary injunction on April 
14, which he later continued). 
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things, evidence strongly suggested Thomas was blackmailing CTB after 
cooperating with NGN to engineer photographic proof of an affair.11 
At this juncture, CTB’s information should have been secure.  Yet, by 
early May, the social network site Twitter was alight with posts about the 
CTB case and other super-injunctions.12  One user posted a list of individuals 
believed to be the anonymous claimants, prompting CTB to begin 
proceedings against the social networking site in order to identify violators.13  
Though Twitter cooperated, the online community’s response was explosive; 
an estimated twelve thousand Twitter users posted CTB’s identity and 
involvement within twenty-four hours of the disclosure request.14  His 
identity thus thoroughly exposed, Ryan Giggs agreed to relinquish the 
anonymity designation by late February of 2012.15   In this instance, Twitter 
became a vehicle by which individuals bypassed a legally binding, though 
unpopular, court order designed to protect the privacy of a U.K. citizen and 
forced private information into the public domain.  Amidst these 
circumstances and the atmosphere of upheaval, Chairman Whittingdale 
voiced his strongly worded concerns about the effect social networking sites 
will have on the application and enforcement of privacy laws in the U.K.16  
How can regulators protect the privacy rights of citizens in the face of user-
driven media like Twitter?  The answer to that question is rather murky. 
Some argue that social network sites are the cause of similar online 
privacy problems and, in circumstances where individuals have not 
voluntarily posted information, they should have the enforceable right to 
demand its removal from the internet.17  Others argue there is no practical 
way to regulate social network sites.18  Whether a comprehensive means of 
adequately regulating social network sites exists is beyond the scope of this 
                                                                                                                   
 11 Id. at [7], [11]. 
 12 Footballer’s Twitter Disclosure Order Prompts Online Action, BBC NEWS UK (May 21, 
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-13482403.  
 13 Id. 
 14 Tweets Spike, supra note 5.  
 15 Ryan Giggs Finally Gives Up Anonymity Over Imogen Thomas ‘Affair,’ TELEGRAPH 
(Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/9095826/Ryan-Giggs-finally-gives-
up-anonymity-over-Imogen-Thomas-affair.html. 
 16 See Mulholland, supra note 1. 
 17 Terence J. Lau, Towards Zero Net Presence, 25 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 
237, 271 (2011) (explaining the concept of “Zero Net Presence,” which would give 
individuals who find personal information online that they did not voluntarily submit the right 
to demand and have that information completely removed from the site). 
 18 See generally James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137 (2009) 
(listing types of regulations that have not been effective resolutions for online privacy 
infringement and suggesting a combination of individual tort liability, reliable privacy 
settings, and user education). 
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Note.  Rather, this Note suggests that the advent of social network sites has 
disrupted the balance of human rights as embodied in the U.K. (and similar 
legal systems) by making it easier for the news media and other individuals 
to force otherwise private information into the public eye.  Dealing 
specifically with the context of celebrities, this Note reexamines the 
protections that the U.K.’s privacy law provides and suggests that the current 
regime should be strengthened in favor of individual rights to privacy rather 
than to the media’s right to free expression. 
Part II describes the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and 
the Human Rights Act of 1998 (HRA), which are the two primary sources 
used to balance privacy rights and freedom of the press in the U.K., and 
which consequently serve as the legal bases for the injunction at issue.19  Part 
III includes a summary of Justice Eady’s holding on Giggs’s injunction and 
additional details regarding the subsequent circumvention of that injunction, 
which better illustrate the British interpretation of privacy law under the 
European Convention.  This information also highlights the opposing views 
of the British courts and the public regarding privacy injunctions.  Part IV 
briefly summarizes historic problems with social network sites generally, 
thus providing a frame through which to understand how social network sites 
influence the viability of proposed privacy solutions.  Part V concludes with 
an analysis of the most likely source of the U.K.’s privacy woes regarding 
super-injunctions and points to a potential solution in the form of altered 
media regulations. 
II.  PRIVACY LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
The U.K.’s privacy laws are strongly influenced by the ECHR,20 to which 
the nation is a party.21  Because of this influence, any understanding of 
privacy law in the U.K. first requires an understanding of the relevant parts 
of the ECHR.  Furthermore, certain aspects of the U.K.’s application of 
ECHR provisions have resulted in public disquiet and political division that 
may be relevant to a meaningful analysis of the Giggs injunction debacle 
                                                                                                                   
 19 See generally CTB v. News Grp. Newspapers, Ltd., [2011] EWHC (QB) 1232 (Eng.) 
(analyzing the case under Convention articles as permitted by the Human Rights Act). 
 20 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, open for 
signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR], available at http://www.echr. 
coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/E NG_CONV.pdf. 
 21 Chart of Signatures and Ratifications, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://conventions.coe.int/Tr 
eaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=005&CM=8&CL=ENG (last updated May 10, 2012) 
(listing various states and their relation to the ECHR and its parts). 
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because they signal a sense of longstanding public disquiet regarding judicial 
application of the privacy law.22 
A.  The European Convention on Human Rights 
“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence.”23  These words, drafted into the ECHR, indicate the 
individual’s right to be protected from intrusion into his or her private life.  
Article 10(1) embodies an equally powerful protection for freedom of 
expression,24 a right including “freedom to hold opinions and to receive and 
impart information and ideas.”25  This does not expressly grant media 
services freedom of the press because the statutory language is couched in 
terms of individuals; however, Article 10(1) is the provision most often used 
to protect media defendants if defamation or similar reputational claims 
brought in ECHR member states reach the European Court of Human Rights 
(Strasbourg Court).26  Both articles serve to protect important rights, but both 
have built-in restrictions on their applications. 
Article 10(2) limits the scope of freedom of expression by providing that: 
 The exercise of these freedoms . . . may be subject to such 
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in 
the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public 
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the 
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the 
authority and impartiality of the judiciary.27 
                                                                                                                   
 22 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 23 ECHR, supra note 20, art. 8, para. 1. 
 24 CTB v. News Grp. Newspapers Ltd., [2011] EWHC (QB) 1232, [32] (Eng.) (quoting the 
Council of Europe as saying: “These rights are neither absolute nor in any hierarchical order, 
since they are of equal value.”). 
 25 ECHR, supra note 20, art. 10, para. 1. 
 26 Régis Bismuth, Standards of Conduct for Journalists Under Europe’s First Amendment, 
8 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 283, 285–86 (2010).  For those having trouble with the alleged 
distinction between the rights of expression and the press, consider ECHR art. 10, para. 1, 
which uses the term “everyone” to define its scope within a convention on human rights, but 
does not clearly establish a right for press agencies.  See supra note 20.  In its most literal 
interpretation, a free press right appears to have less to do with an individual human right than 
with the right of a media agency to conduct itself in a particular manner. 
 27 ECHR, supra note 20, art. 10, para. 2 (emphasis added). 
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When analyzing cases under this paragraph the Strasbourg Court looks to 
three factors: (1) whether the interference with expression has been 
prescribed by law, (2) whether the interference serves one of the legitimate 
aims listed in the paragraph, and (3) whether the interference is necessary to 
a democratic society.28  According to Article 10(2), the right to reputation, 
which is protected by Article 8(1) of the ECHR, is a legitimate aim sufficient 
to limit the freedom of the press or expression in general.29  However, this 
does not mean that any matter considered private under Article 8 can be 
blocked from media reports via injunction.   
On the contrary, Article 8(2) has its own exceptions that largely mirror 
the language found in Article 10(2).30  The most relevant portions read, 
“There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right [to privacy] except such as . . . is necessary in a democratic 
society . . . or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”31  The 
language of this article appears to form the basis of a public interest 
exception to individual privacy whereby the media and others could obtain a 
right to comment on another’s private matter if it falls within the scope of 
“information debated in a democratic society.”32  
What constitutes the “public interest” has come to include political, 
social, and foreign issues; health and science breakthroughs; and information 
related to private corporations and their executives.33  The Strasbourg 
Court’s reasoning behind this exception has been the media’s role as a 
societal “watchdog,” a concept shared with the United States.34  
The relationship that appears to emerge from Articles 8 and 10 is one of 
balance between the right to privacy and the right to free expression; the first 
right appears to be balanced by the public interest exception, while the 
second appears to be balanced by a private interest exception.  This 
interpretation is supported by a judicially forged balancing test created to 
weigh an individual’s right to privacy against the presumptively superior 
interests of a democratic public in free expression and the press.35  As is 
                                                                                                                   
 28 Bismuth, supra note 26, at 288–89. 
 29 See ECHR, supra note 20, art. 10, para. 2. 
 30 Compare id. art. 8, para. 2, with id. art. 10, para. 2. 
 31 Id. art. 8, para. 2. 
 32 Bismuth, supra note 26, at 291. 
 33 Id. at 292. 
 34 Id. at 290–91; Kyu Ho Youm, Liberalizing British Defamation Law: A Case of Importing 
the First Amendment?, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 415, 445 (2008) (noting consistency between 
U.K. case holdings in support of the watchdog function and the U.S. First Amendment). 
 35 Bismuth, supra note 26, at 290 (observing that the “weighted balancing test” appears to 
lend freedom of expression a favorable presumption rebuttable by a sufficiently narrow 
private exception). 
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explained below, a key element of this balance is the nature of disseminated 
information.  In the old Anglo-American system, factual or true information 
could serve as an absolute defense when the plaintiff’s concern was 
reputational harm.36  However, Strasbourg jurisprudence demonstrates that 
when the issue involves an alleged breach of the plaintiff’s privacy, the 
determinative factor is not truth, but whether the information is 
“newsworthy” in the sense that it is beneficial to societal debate.37   
The Strasbourg Court took steps to clarify this difference in Von 
Hannover v. Germany, a case in which a member of Monaco’s royal family 
sued to keep pictures of her private life out of the news media.38  The court 
noted the need to distinguish “between reporting facts—even controversial 
ones—capable of contributing to a debate in a democratic society relating to 
politicians in the exercise of their functions . . . and reporting details of the 
private life of an individual who . . . does not exercise official functions.”39  
In the latter situation, information is considered purely private (not 
newsworthy) and outside the protection of Article 10 free expression; in the 
former situation the media would be fulfilling its democratic duty by 
reporting information that affects the function of democratic society 
(newsworthy).40  The court continued to highlight the distinction by giving 
an example of ordinarily private information with clear implications for 
societal functioning: the release of medical information regarding a head of 
state.41 
In summary, newsworthiness appears to be the factor capable of 
activating the public interest defense to a breach of privacy.  Proving 
newsworthiness grants a media defendant the protections of Article 10, 
otherwise the plaintiff’s Article 8 right to privacy controls.  Key to 
determining whether information is newsworthy is whether it involves a 
public figure acting within the scope of his duties for the state or facts that 
otherwise impact the proper functioning of the state. 
B.  Human Rights Act 1998: The U.K. Bill of Rights 
Initially, membership in the ECHR meant that British citizens could bring 
charges against the government before the Strasbourg Court for trial in an 
                                                                                                                   
 36 Youm, supra note 34, at 421–22. 
 37 Bismuth, supra note 26, at 293. 
 38 Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 8–9, available at http://www. 
echr.coe.int.  
 39 Id. para. 63. 
 40 See id. (“[I]n the former case the press exercises its vital role of ‘watchdog’ in a 
democracy . . . .”).  
 41 Bismuth, supra note 26, at 294 (referring to a case cited by the court in Von Hannover). 
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international, rather than domestic, forum.42  Part of the U.K.’s response to 
this lack of control over human rights cases was to create the HRA, 
sometimes colloquially referred to as the U.K.’s bill of rights.43  The HRA 
incorporates the ECHR into U.K. law by codifying, among others, Articles 8 
and 10.44  In doing so, British courts seized control of local human rights 
cases by permitting citizens to bring any claims based on ECHR rights in 
domestic courts, thus removing the necessity of bringing domestic British 
claims to Strasbourg.45  Though the Strasbourg court continues to function as 
primary interpreter, introduction of the HRA enabled British courts to 
assume some degree of interpretive power regarding the grievances arising in 
the U.K. 
The HRA does more than protect privacy and free expression vis-à-vis 
ECHR language.  Certain sections have been interpreted to expand judicial 
power by granting courts broad oversight on legislative matters regarding the 
adopted human rights.46  For example, Section 4 of the HRA gives U.K. 
courts the additional power to issue declarations of incompatibility, which 
instruct Parliament that a law does not satisfy ECHR standards and should be 
changed to do so.47  Though the declarations are not binding on legislators or 
case parties,48 the power to broadly interpret ECHR compatibility and then 
advise legislators seems to have been a substantial shift in judicial power.  
This infusion of power into British courts partially abrogated parliamentary 
                                                                                                                   
 42 Joanne Sweeny, The United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act: Using Its Past to Predict Its 
Future, 12 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 39, 42 (2010) (“Originally, the ECHR was intended as a 
vehicle where nations could bring grievances against each other, but it was later expanded to 
allow individual citizens to sue their own countries before the European Court of Human 
Rights . . . .”).  See, e.g., Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A.) (1976), 
available at http://www.echr.coe.int (holding the British government did not breach 
individual’s Article 10 rights by preventing further dissemination of obscene books to 
schools). 
 43 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K.) [hereinafter HRA], available at http://www.legisla 
tion.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42; Sweeny, supra note 42, at 40. 
 44 HRA, supra note 43, § 1(1)(a) (adopting European Convention on Human Rights 
Articles 2–12). 
 45 See Brief for Professors of Int’l Law, Federal Jurisdiction and the Foreign Relations Law 
of the United States  as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 
660 (2005) (No. 04-5928), 2005 WL 497763, at *25 (saying the HRA is “the legal basis for 
domestic enforcement of the Convention”); Sweeny, supra note 42, at 42–43 (noting that 
incorporation of ECHR allows British citizens to bring ECHR rights cases against their own 
government before domestic courts). 
 46 See Sweeny, supra note 42, at 43–44 (analyzing language in § 3 of the HRA that 
suggests courts can “creatively interpret statutes” based on a broad possibility standard that 
only prohibits judges from making impossible interpretations rather than unreasonable ones). 
 47 HRA, supra note 43, § 4. 
 48 Id. § 4(6). 
2012] DEATH BY BIRDSONG 195 
 
and executive power,49 at least in the human rights context, and raised fears 
of a judicial end-run on Parliament.50  The fear that judges could use their 
increased power to effectively seize control of the legislative process is one 
explanation for why the HRA has had staunch opponents since its adoption, 
particularly in the Conservative Party and tabloid media.51  With the 
foundational legal principles established, a detailed analysis of CTB v. News 
Group Newspapers Ltd., and additional facts surrounding the breach of 
privacy by Twitter users is warranted.  
III.  BRITAIN’S ENERGIZER INJUNCTION 
The injunction request and Twitter activity recounted in the introduction 
to this Note spawned a series of cases between the parties.  The following 
three cases52 involving Giggs will help explicate the U.K.’s privacy law, and 
are conveniently bound to the factual basis of this Note.   
A.  The Grant of Injunction 
In the first case, which is the original injunction proceeding referenced in 
the introduction, Justice Eady turned to the HRA and the balancing test to 
weigh the competing rights of privacy and free expression found in the 
ECHR.53  The court relied on a two stage test: first determine if the subject 
matter of the injunction “give[s] rise to a ‘reasonable expectation of 
privacy,’ ” and then, if there is a reasonable expectation, proceed to weigh 
“countervailing considerations” against that Article 8 right to privacy.54  The 
specific countervailing considerations were the Article 10 rights of Thomas, 
                                                                                                                   
 49 There is some question whether the HRA 1998 tips the proverbial legal scales or whether 
it in fact balances the division of power among the branches of government.  According to 
Sweeny, supra note 42, at 45, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty typically requires 
judicial deference to legislative interpretations by Parliament.  Yet, the executive exerts strong 
control over Parliament due to the U.K.’s party structure.  Therefore, “the judiciary essentially 
defers to the Government.” Id.  
 50 CTB v. News Grp. Newspapers Ltd., [2011] EWHC (QB) 1232, [20], [2011] All E.R. 
(D) 142 (Q.B.) (Eng.) (noting concern that judiciary might bypass parliament and create new 
set of privacy laws); see also Dan Milmo, Campbell Verdict Allays Fears of Backdoor Privacy 
Law, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 14, 2002), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2002/oct/14/pressand 
publishing.privacy1.  
 51 Sweeny, supra note 42, at 63, 74–75. 
 52 See generally CTB, [2011] EWHC (QB) 1232; CTB v. News Grp. Newspapers, Ltd., 
[2011] EWHC (QB) 1326 (Eng.); CTB v. News Grp. Newspapers, Ltd., [2011] EWHC (QB) 
1334 (Eng.). 
 53 CTB, [2011] EWHC (QB) 1232 at [19]. 
 54 Id. at [23]–[24]. 
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NGN, and the general public interest of citizens in receiving information.55  
Justice Eady reiterated that an essential part of the Article 10 consideration is 
whether publication would contribute to public debate as described in Von 
Hannover v. Germany and similar cases.56 
Justice Eady applied the two-prong test succinctly.  First, because the 
subject matter involved intimate and sexual behavior and was not conducted 
publicly, it appeared clear under both U.K. and Strasbourg jurisprudence that 
Giggs had a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the relationship.57  
In short, the Justice Eady concluded that the Giggs was entitled to expect 
Article 8(1) protection.58  Next, Justice Eady noted precedent regarding the 
court’s need “to take into account and have regard to the interests of the 
claimant’s family members, and their rights under Article 8 . . . .”59  Since 
Giggs was married with children, the interests of his family and their own 
privacy were added to Giggs’s privacy side of the balancing equation; this 
addition strengthened his claim.60  Finally, Justice Eady reasoned that the 
likelihood that Giggs was being blackmailed, itself an illegal action, 
engendered support for his preliminary request for anonymity as a matter of 
public policy and to discourage criminal activity.61 
The court then turned to the question of whether the public interest 
exception of ECHR Article 8(2) should override Giggs’s right to expect the 
subject matter to remain private.62  Justice Eady held that the free speech 
rights of neither NGN nor Thomas could control regarding any subject 
matter not then in the public domain, a factor that became more important as 
the injunction later unraveled.63  The court described the subject matter as a 
“kiss and tell” case, and noted the improbability that it could be considered a 
matter of public interest under the ECHR, especially since the defendants did 
not attempt to raise a public interest defense.64  This characterization of the 
case follows the trend of both Strasbourg and U.K. precedent, which referred 
to similar subject matter as “tittle-tattle” or “tawdry allegations” not entitled 
                                                                                                                   
 55 Id. at [24]. 
 56 Id. at [25]; see also Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 63, 
available at http://www.echr.coe.int. 
 57 CTB, [2011] EWHC (QB) 1232 at [23]. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at [3]. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at [22]. 
 62 Id. at [23]–[24]. 
 63 Id. at [27], [37]. 
 64 Id. at [26] (“As in so many ‘kiss and tell’ cases, it seems to me that the answer, at stage 
two, is not far to seek.  Indeed, it was not even argued that publication would serve the public 
interest.”). 
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to the public interest exception and Article 10 protections “afforded to more 
serious journalism.”65   
To put the decision in other terms, the affair, although interesting to the 
public, is not in the public interest.  It is not newsworthy within the definition 
of Strasbourg jurisprudence and so should not be reported to the extent that 
such reporting would trample upon the privacy of its subjects against their 
will.66   
Before moving to the public reaction, one must note that the decision in 
the Giggs case, although often called a super-injunction, is in actuality a 
traditional injunction.  A super-injunction essentially bars all mention of the 
injunction proceedings and its related subject matter.67  Contrary to that 
definition, Justice Eady commented that the decision to uphold Giggs’s right 
to privacy did not eliminate Thomas’s right to free expression or prohibit her 
sale of the story in any way that did not “intrude upon the privacy rights of 
others.”68  Since Thomas retained some right to discuss the subject matter of 
the injunction, the equitable relief that Giggs obtained should not rightly be 
called a super-injunction.  Further, a narrow interpretation of this decision 
means that Thomas and the news media were prohibited from exposing 
Giggs’s identity.69  A broad interpretation of the decision is that anonymity 
injunctions like the one in CTB v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. do not 
destroy an individual’s Article 10 rights to freedom of expression or the 
press.  Instead, such cases merely abridge those rights to the extent necessary 
to protect another’s, equally important and legally proven, right to privacy 
under the rule and exceptions of ECHR Article 8.  Considering the broad 
interpretation, the furor following this decision should perhaps come as a bit 
of a surprise. 
B.  The Twitter Breach: The Aftermath of CTB 
Ultimately, readers already know what happened following the decision: 
citizens of the U.K., outraged by the new gag order, identified CTB as soccer 
player Ryan Giggs and exposed this information using Twitter.70  
                                                                                                                   
 65 Id. at [33]. 
 66 See Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 63, available at http:// 
www.echr.coe.int (noting the distinction to be drawn between newsworthy and non-
newsworthy subject matter). 
 67 Thomas Sanchez, London, Libel Capital No Longer?: The Draft Defamation Act 2011 
and the Future of Libel Tourism, 9 U.N.H. L. REV. 469, 518–19 (2011). 
 68 CTB, [2011] EWHC (QB) 1232 at [13] (“Claimant was fully entitled to the protection of 
anonymity . . . .”). 
 69 Id. at [38]. 
 70 See discussion supra Part I. 
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Understanding the reasons for the public’s negative response is important to 
the remaining cases as well as later analysis.   
The news media refers to the injunction granted as a “super-injunction” or 
“gag order,” a hotly debated form of injunction that prohibits the press or any 
individual from referring to any information regarding the injunction, 
including mention of its existence or any related details.71  The injunction 
granted by Justice Eady was not in fact a super-injunction because it did not 
require absolute silence on all related matters; however, the term is now 
commonly used to refer to most injunctions brought by celebrities in the 
U.K.72  Because super-injunctions are so controversial the cases may be 
burdened by the negative connotation of an inaccurate classification.73 
The CTB decision came on the tail end of a series of similar privacy 
injunctions that were brought primarily by the well-to-do.  The list of 
applicants included an oil trading company,74 journalist,75 former bank chief 
executive,76 and several professional athletes.77  As appears typical in these 
situations, newspapers declared that a new gag order was in effect and rushed 
to reveal as much information as possible shortly after Justice Eady granted 
the injunction.78  The nature of these news reports may not have always been 
innocent or intended to conform to the spirit of the injunction.  Evidence 
presented in the first appeal to the CTB injunction strongly suggested that 
                                                                                                                   
 71 See Sanchez, supra note 67; see also Timeline of Events Leading to Naming of Ryan Giggs 
as Footballer at Centre of Privacy Injunction Row, TELEGRAPH (May 24, 2011), http://www.tele 
graph.co.uk/technology/twitter/8531560/Timeline-of-events-leading-to-naming-of-Ryan-Giggs-a 
s-footballer-at-centre-of-privacy-injunction-row.html [hereinafter Timeline] (noting publication 
of year-long review of super-injunctions, as well as concerns voiced in Parliament by MPs and 
the Prime Minister, quoted as calling the privacy rulings “unsustainable” and “unfair”). 
 72 Sanchez, supra note 67, at 519. 
 73 See Timeline, supra note 71 (noting controversy surrounding super-injunctions generally). 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id.; see also Robert Winnett, Sir Fred Goodwin ‘Acted Like He Was Off to Play Golf’ as  
RBS Collapsed, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/b  
nksandfinance/8736315/Sir-Fred-Goodwin-acted-like-he-was-off-to-play-golf-as-RBS-collapse 
d.html (identifying Sir Fred Goodwin as former chief executive of the Royal Bank of Scotland). 
 77 See, e.g., Martin Evans, Journalist Could Be Jailed over Twitter Comments About 
Injunctions, TELEGRAPH (May 23, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/twitter/853007 
6/Journalist-could-be-jailed-over-Twitter-comments-about-injunctions.html (referring to two 
separate situations involving soccer players). 
 78 See, e.g., Imogen Thomas Vents Fury over Super-Injection Allegations, TELEGRAPH (May 
16, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/twitter/8517075/Imogen-Thomas-vents-fury-o 
ver-super-injunction-allegations.html; Tom Wells & Nick Parker, All that Prem Ace Gave Me 
was Handbag and Gag: Imogen Thomas rubbishes Blackmail Claim, SUN (May 18, 2011), 
http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/3586202/Gagged-Imogen-Thomas-denies-blackm 
ailing-former-footballer-lover-saying-all-she-got-from-him-was-a-250-handbag.html; see also 
MNB v. News Grp. Newspapers Ltd., [2011] EWHC (QB) 528, [8] (Eng.). 
2012] DEATH BY BIRDSONG 199 
 
certain elements of the news media promoted “jigsaw identification”79 by 
regularly providing the public with hints about super-injunction claimants or 
blatantly revealing identities when asked.80 
At any rate, certain individuals on Twitter were able to surmise that CTB 
was in fact Giggs, and when he attempted to protect his privacy against those 
individuals, the online community retaliated with a wholesale exposure of his 
identity.81  At that point virtually anyone who wanted access to Giggs’s 
identity could have discovered it with relative ease.  The fact that Giggs’s 
identity appeared to be in the public domain became the prime argument in 
NGN’s appeal for a variance to the injunction.82 
 Indeed some language in the original opinion seemed to suggest that 
information in the public domain was fair game for the news media.83  
Despite this language, Justice Eady, while presiding over the second case, 
rejected the variance on the grounds that NGN misunderstood the purpose 
behind privacy related anonymity and the passage of information into the 
public domain.84  Drawing a distinction between commercial secrets (like a 
secret recipe) and Article 8 rights, he explained that the truth or falsity of 
information is often irrelevant because the law of individual privacy is not as 
concerned with guarding secrets as it is with guarding against intrusions.85  
So despite ease of online availability, a privacy injunction continues to serve 
a purpose so long as some intrusion is prevented; “each exposure of personal 
information . . . whether by way of visual images or verbally, . . . is a new 
intrusion and occasion for distress or embarrassment.”86   
In summary, the court’s analyses of cases before and after the Twitter 
breach suggest a distinction between social network sites and traditional 
news media.  By characterizing each as a separate type of information 
medium the court marks them as separate sources of intrusion that can be 
limited independent of one another.87  Therefore, under the intrusion-
                                                                                                                   
 79 MNB, [2011] EWHC (QB) 528 at [27] (defining jigsaw identification as “correctly 
identifying someone as a result of relating separate snippets of information”). 
 80 CTB v. News Grp. Newspapers, Ltd., [2011] EWHC (QB) 1326, [8] (Eng.). 
 81 See Tweets Spike, supra note 5.  
 82 CTB, [2011] EWHC (QB) 1326 at [2]. 
 83 CTB v. News Grp. Newspapers, Ltd., [2011] EWHC (QB) 1232,  [27] (Eng.) (explaining 
that “the court will not attempt to prevent publication or discussion of material that is 
genuinely in the public domain since, where that is so, there will no longer be any 
confidentiality or privacy to protect”). 
 84 CTB, [2011] EWHC (QB) 1326 at [18]–[23] (distinguishing cases put forward in support 
of NGN’s position as well as the nature of privacy rights under ECHR). 
 85 Id. at [23]. 
 86 Id. at [24]. 
 87 See id. (noting that the release of Giggs’s identity on social media was a separate 
intrusion and not sufficient to release the news media from the injunction). 
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blocking purpose of privacy law as explained by Justice Eady, release of 
information into one medium does not necessarily constitute entry into the 
public domain sufficient to allow other mediums to report the protected 
information. 
Justice Eady also distinguished CTB from Mosley v. News Group 
Newspapers Ltd., in which the court refused to grant an injunction for 
information already in the public domain.88  He did so on the ground that 
Giggs’s identity became known only after the injunction was already granted 
and took the stance that “[d]ifferent policy considerations come into play 
when the court is invited to abandon the protection it has given a litigant on 
the basis of widespread attempts to render it ineffective.”89  This implies that 
a higher standard applies when the court revokes an existing injunction than 
when it denies an initial grant of injunction in accordance with Mosley.  One 
might believe Justice Eady fairly settled the matter, but that assumption 
would be wrong. 
C.  Aftermath of the Second Decision 
Mere minutes after the judicial decision to uphold anonymity, Mr. 
Hemming, a Member of Parliament (MP), echoed the sentiments of NGN 
when he used parliamentary privilege to formally reveal CTB’s identity 
during session.90  “With about 75,000 people having named Ryan Giggs on 
Twitter,” he said, “it’s obviously impractical to imprison them all.”91  NGN 
quickly petitioned again to remove the anonymity order on the basis of the 
MP’s statement; but again, the court denied any variance.92  Justice 
Tugendhat reiterated many of Justice Eady’s points from the prior appeal and 
expounded on his reasoning: 
The fact that a question has been asked in Parliament seems to 
me to increase . . . the strength of his case that he and his 
family need that protection.  The order has not protected the 
claimant and his family from taunting on the internet.  It is still 
effective to protect them from taunting and other intrusion and 
harassment in the print media.93 
                                                                                                                   
 88 Mosley v. News Grp. Newspapers, Ltd., [2008] EWHC (QB) 687, [36] (Eng.). 
 89 CTB, [2011] EWHC (QB) 1326 at [18]–[19]. 
 90 Mulholland, supra note 1. 
 91 Id. 
 92 CTB v. News Grp. Newspapers, Ltd., [2011] EWHC (QB) 1334 (Eng.). 
 93 Id. at [3]. 
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This tenacious support of the injunction, which some could consider 
ridiculous in light of the facts, is best summarized by recognizing that as 
unsustainable as the injunction may seem, “the law is the law and the judges 
must interpret what the law is.”94  In other words, until legislative change 
alters the rules that judges must follow, the court must interpret the law in 
accordance with existing standards and policy regardless of the veracity of 
public opposition.  In this situation, that appears to mean support for the 
preservation of privacy rights. 
Nevertheless, the practical effect of the Twitter disclosure was to reveal 
Giggs’s identity and erode the value of the injunction then in place.  Ryan 
Giggs’s name and photo appeared frequently in the news media despite the 
court’s defense of his position.95  The initial question some may ask is: what 
can be done to reduce or eliminate the use of social network sites in ways 
that breach court orders?  Though some might consider ways in which 
regulators might crack down on social network sites, such regulation is not 
likely to solve the privacy issue at play.  This is due as much to the facts of 
the cases just addressed as it is to the nature of social network sites.  In order 
to help explain this, the next section is a brief discussion of social network 
sites and privacy issues related to them. 
IV.  SOCIAL NETWORK SITES 
Social network sites, such as Twitter and Facebook, are an increasingly 
popular form of interactive online media.96  Unlike other forms of electronic 
media, which function primarily as communication mediums, social network 
sites bear a distinctly relational element that seems to encourage their 
proliferation.97  In addition, an increasing level of interconnection exists 
between the different social network sites.98  These sites are used with 
increasing frequency in diverse areas including consumer data tracking,99 
                                                                                                                   
 94 Gordon Rayner, Ryan Giggs Named as Premier League Footballer in Gagging Order 
Row, TELEGRAPH (May 23, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/twitter/8531175/ 
Ryan-Giggs-named-as-Premier-League-footballer-in-gagging-order-row.html (quoting British 
Prime Minister David Cameron). 
 95 E.g., Mulholland, supra note 1.  
 96 See #numbers, TWITTER BLOG (Mar. 14, 2011, 11:38 AM), http://blog.twitter.com/2011/0 
3/numbers.html (noting that in February 2011, the average number of new Twitter accounts 
per day was 460,000). 
 97 Grimmelmann, supra note 18, at 1154. 
 98 See Brian Kane, Balancing Anonymity, Popularity, & Micro-Celebrity: The Crossroads 
of Social Networking & Privacy, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 327, 329–30 (2010) (noting ability 
to link Facebook and Twitter accounts). 
 99 See Lau, supra note 17, at 243 (referring to Facebook Beacon, which tracked and shared 
a user’s online purchases). 
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marketing,100 and political campaigning.101  In the legal sphere they are 
sometimes used for marketing services or even as evidence, and may bear 
legal implications in privacy, intellectual property, and criminal matters.102  
A counterpoint to the beneficial features that keep users logged in is the 
difficulty of setting adequate regulations for user protection.103 
Social network sites may be defined as “web-based services that allow 
individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded 
system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, 
and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others 
within the system.”104  Websites usually take one of two basic forms for 
facilitating these connections: symmetrical or asymmetrical.105  In the 
former, users become contacts only by mutual assent—such as friend 
requests on Facebook—while users of the latter may add a contact without 
being added or accepted by that person—such as “following” someone on 
Twitter.106  This basic description is a helpful guide for understanding social 
network site functionality but hardly scratches the surface of the medium’s 
capabilities or application. 
Each social network site can offer a dizzying array of features, many of 
which appear similar; yet not every social network offers the same level of 
functionality.  For example, Facebook allows users to catalogue a wealth of 
personal data including name, birthday, contact information, political views, 
educational and employment history, relational status, sexual preference, and 
favorite movies and books.107  It can also be used to manage events and store 
photos.108  Twitter, on the other hand, is of more limited applicability.  It 
only allows users to post whatever they can fit in a 140-character limit.109  
Though it still permits the use of photos, video, and other media, Twitter 
focuses less on the individual and more on the content of their posts (called 
                                                                                                                   
 100 Grimmelmann, supra note 18, at 1183. 
 101 Lau, supra note 17, at 246. 
 102 See generally Sharon Nelson et al., The Legal Implications of Social Networking, 22 
REGENT U. L. REV. 1 (2009–2010) (providing broad overview of problems stemming from 
social networking sites). 
 103 Kane, supra note 98, at 344–45. 
 104 Grimmelmann, supra note 18, at 1142. 
 105 Id. at 1143. 
 106 Id.; see Adding Friends & Friend Requests, FACEBOOK HELP CENTER, http://www.facebo 
ok.com/help/friends/requests (last visited Dec. 10, 2012) (explaining friend requests); What is 
Following, TWITTER HELP CENTER, http://support.twitter.com/articles/14019-what-is-following 
(last visited Dec. 10, 2012) (describing “following” as subscribing to another user’s posts). 
 107 Grimmelman, supra note 18, at 1149. 
 108 Id. at 1149, 1151. 
 109 About Twitter, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/about (last visited Oct. 22, 2011). 
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“Tweets”).110  Of course the trouble with writing about technology is that it is 
constantly changing, and the limit of what is possible is always growing; 
social networks are no less prone to this trend.   
A social network today is not necessarily what it was last year, last 
month, or yesterday.111  Even the number of users can grow at a staggering 
rate.112  Social networks are accessible from any number of portable 
electronic devices such as smartphones, iPods, iPads, other tablet devices, 
and computers via Internet browser or dedicated application.113  
Consequently, they can be accessed virtually anywhere or by anyone with 
the proper tools.114  As is explained below, social network sites not only have 
a growing level of connectivity with other forms of technology, but also with 
each other and various other forms of online media.  
Most major news sites prominently display links to several popular social 
network sites in the sidebars of their reports, encouraging readers to share the 
story with their contacts.115  Twitter is able to link with Facebook directly, 
thus increasing the ease with which information can spread across 
networks.116  For example, a post that once would only have been distributed 
to a user’s Twitter network can now simultaneously appear on Facebook 
where it is available to the contacts in that user’s network, who may or may 
not be the same as the user’s Twitter contacts.  Keep in mind that each 
contact has the ability to repost or forward most information from virtually 
anywhere, thus spreading the information to their own unique network of 
contacts.117  Technology permits information to spread exponentially over 
social network sites.118  However, the power to quickly disseminate 
                                                                                                                   
 110 Id. 
 111 See Grimmelmann, supra note 18, at 1145 (“Facebook’s pace of innovation is so 
blisteringly fast that it’s not uncommon to log into the site and see that part of the interface 
has changed overnight to offer a new feature.”). 
 112 See #numbers, supra note 96 (listing growth statistics). 
 113 Elise Moreau, Social Networking on Mobile Devices Increased by 37% Since Last Year, 
ABOUT.COM WEB TRENDS (Oct. 21, 2011), http://webtrends.about.com/b/2011/10/21/social-ne 
tworking-mobile-devices.htm; see also Kane, supra note 98, at 346. 
 114 See, e.g., Nelson et al., supra note 102, at 4, 9–10 (listing instances when social 
networking sites were used by jurors, lawyers, or judges during court proceedings). 
 115 See, e.g., Henry Fountain, Expert Says Quakes in England May Be Tied to Gas 
Extraction, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2011, at A12.   
 116 How to Use Twitter with Facebook, TWITTER HELP CENTER, http://support.twitter.com/ar 
ticles/31113-how-to-use-twitter-with-facebook (last visited Oct. 21, 2011); see also Kane, 
supra note 98, at 330 (describing integration of social networks). 
 117 See, e.g., How to Retweet: A Simple Guide, BLOGGING BITS (Apr. 17, 2008), http://blogg 
ingbits.com/the-art-and-science-of-retweeting-for-twitteraholics/ (explaining how to repost 
and spread content on Twitter). 
 118 See Kane, supra note 98, at 346 (describing ease with which technology allows 
information to be endlessly forwarded). 
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information is accompanied by the risk of loss or breach of private 
information. 
A.  Privacy Concerns 
A study of the literature reveals two general types of privacy problems: 
those caused by the conduct of service providers and those caused by the 
conduct of users.119 
1. Provider Created Problems 
Provider related privacy issues arise because social network sites are 
relational tools, and to facilitate these relationships, users grant the websites 
access to certain personal information.120  Increased accessibility may have 
unintended consequences, such as the loss of employment opportunities that 
result when employers find information that users did not intend to be 
public.121  This sort of loss may occur because social network sites 
sometimes appear to provide more security and online isolation than they in 
fact do.122  In this context, the revelation of private material may not be 
intentional, but it does result from the choice of social network providers to 
assume a certain site structure. 
Often the information users share has market value for the service 
provider and can be used directly by them.123  For example, Facebook’s 
privacy policy says that user data helps to improve the overall service 
provided.124  Targeted advertisement is considered part of this improvement 
and is achieved by sharing user data with advertisers or collecting more data 
about user habits from other online affiliates of the social network site.125 
Furthermore, social network site providers are notorious for suddenly 
changing privacy policy terms, as well as featured privacy tools or 
                                                                                                                   
 119 See generally Grimmelmann, supra note 18. 
 120 See id. at 1154 (explaining how social networking sites are used for relationship 
building). 
 121 See id. at 1166 (discussing how employers can gain access to Facebook); Kane, supra 
note 98, at 341 (“[A] quick search following an employee calling in sick may lead to the 
discovery of posted information leading to that employee’s termination.”). 
 122 Grimmelmann, supra note 18, at 1162, 1169. 
 123 Tal Z. Zarsky, Law and Online Social Networks: Mapping the Challenges and Promises 
of User-Generated Information Flows, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 741, 
762–63 (2008). 
 124 Data Use Policy: Information We Receive and How It Is Used, FACEBOOK, http://www. 
facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info#howweuse (last visited Oct. 23, 2011). 
 125 Id.  
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settings.126  These changes may ultimately benefit the users’ privacy 
concerns but often occur so suddenly that they create gaps in privacy armor; 
users either do not realize there is a need to adjust their settings or struggle to 
readjust in light of a now unfamiliar user interface.127  For those most 
concerned with provider-generated privacy issues, the sense of disquiet boils 
down to a conviction that so much personal information concentrated in the 
hands of providers raises a bevy of potential data usage abuses.128  The other 
class of privacy issues causing concern involves situations arising directly 
between two or more users.129 
2.  Peer-to-Peer Problems 
According to Professor James Grimmelmann, there is another, more 
destructive, class of privacy issues centered on the concept of “peer-to-peer” 
privacy violations, a theory of violation under which the social network site 
takes a neutral role and is considered less an active violator than a catalyst 
through which users perpetrate privacy violations upon one another.130  
Professor Grimmelmann points out six forms of peer-to-peer violation: 
“disclosure, surveillance, instability, disagreement, spillovers, and 
denigration.”131  This section focuses on the last three. 
“Disagreement” refers to the implied dispute regarding the type of content 
different users consider acceptable for online viewing and may relate to the 
social image a user wishes to portray.132  Grimmelmann uses the example of 
photo tagging and untagging on Facebook.133  The user who initially “tags” a 
photo creates a clear link between that image and the tagee’s profile; they do 
so because of a belief that the photo’s content is acceptable material to 
display.  However, if the tagee subsequently chooses to untag the photo and 
remove that link it may be because they have a different concept of what is 
acceptable for online publication.134  Even if unintentional, the tagging 
process affords users an opportunity to reveal information the tagee did not 
want displayed. 
                                                                                                                   
 126 Grimmelmann, supra note 18, at 1169. 
 127 See id. at 1169–70 (giving examples of how changes can affect online relationships and 
interaction). 
 128 Id. at 1187. 
 129 See id. at 1187–88 (describing how peer-to-peer violations will occur regardless of 
safeguards social network sites use).  
 130 Id. at 1164. 
 131 Id. 
 132 See id. at 1171–74. 
 133 Id. at 1171. 
 134 Id. at 1171–72. 
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The “spillovers” category is linked to the implicit network structure of 
social network sites, through which users seek out and accept contacts.135  
Professor Grimmelmann identifies two problems that arise during the process 
of acquiring contacts.  First, by incorporating others into their network, users 
open themselves up to aggregation studies wherein researchers can glean 
highly accurate information about nationality, sexual orientation, or other 
traits (even hidden ones) simply by observing the predominate traits of a 
user’s contacts.136  Second, users are more willing to accept mere 
acquaintances as contacts, thereby opening themselves to individuals they 
would not normally give implicit trust and “who are less likely to understand 
or respect [their] individual privacy preferences.”137 
“Denigration” emerges in more traditional cases of defamation and refers 
to situations in which one user takes action that inaccurately characterizes or 
misappropriates the other’s online identity.138  The person harmed need not 
be a user, nor must the information necessarily be false.139  This problem is 
particularly detrimental because the nature of social networks leads users to 
ascribe a higher level of credibility to posts and profile content while 
simultaneously precipitating the spread of such content, thus making it easier 
to cause reputational harm whether the information spread is false or true.140 
The common thread among these violations appears to be that individuals 
are able to compromise the privacy (actual or perceived) of themselves, other 
users, and even non-users.  Understanding even these few categories of 
privacy infringement shows that participating in an online social network can 
be a high-risk endeavor regardless of the source of the privacy infringement.  
But if privacy is so threatened, why use social networks at all? 
B.  The Benefits of Social Network Sites 
If social networks are such a risk, why are they so popular?  Is it as 
Facebook creator Mark Zuckerberg suggested: do people care less about 
privacy in the online era?141  If that is the case, then perhaps the U.K.’s best 
                                                                                                                   
 135 See id. at 1174. 
 136 See id. (referring to study in which researchers predicted user ages and nationalities 
based on their contacts). 
 137 See id. at 1175. 
 138 Id. at 1176. 
 139 See id. (noting one case where user created a false account using the claimant’s name and 
filled it with false information, and referring back to photo tagging); see also Lau, supra note 
17, at 253. 
 140 Grimmelmann, supra note 18, at 1176–77. 
 141 Connie Davis Powell, “You Already Have Zero Privacy. Get Over It!” Would Warren 
and Brandeis Argue for Privacy for Social Networking?, 31 PACE L. REV. 146, 163 (2011). 
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solution is to ignore the matter and let the few disgruntled individuals 
(celebrity or otherwise) deal with the fallout; perhaps loss of privacy is the 
price paid for technological advancement.  Zuckerberg may be correct on 
some level, but his statement oversimplifies matters.  On one hand, people 
have personal concerns for socialization that motivate them to use social 
network sites despite reputational risk.142  On the other, social networks 
provide an expeditious structure for dealing with matters of public 
concern.143  These sites are not only a method of satisfying human needs for 
social contact, they are also efficient and trendy tools for handling 
democratically important situations. 
Social interaction is of particular importance to human beings.144  Social 
network sites help satisfy human needs by providing opportunities to 
construct personal identity, develop and strengthen individual relationships, 
and foster a sense of community.145  Thus, Professor Grimmelmann posits 
that the human desire for sociality is so entrenched that the offer of a social 
experience effects the evaluation of privacy risks.146  Furthermore, social 
network sites present a structure that may give false impressions of privacy 
and intimacy that encourage users to expose themselves more than they 
would otherwise.147  Beyond these private motivations however, there are 
several public benefits. 
Social network sites may be used to advance matters of public interest by 
providing new avenues for political campaigns, humanitarian awareness and 
aid, and dissemination of newsworthy information.148  This last function may 
be the most important public function of social network sites because it 
essentially means that traditional forms of media cease to be the only or even 
the most effective methods of disseminating news.149  By both permitting the 
                                                                                                                   
 142 Grimmelmann, supra note 18, at 1151. 
 143 See Zarsky, supra note 123, at 742 (noting the speed of data transfer in a network 
structure).  See, e.g., Lau, supra note 17, at 246 (“Politicians use Twitter to communicate their 
thoughts directly to constituents.”). 
 144 Grimmelmann, supra note 18, at 1159 (citing Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs to 
demonstrate theoretical importance of sociality). 
 145 Id. at 1152–57. 
 146 Id. at 1151. 
 147 Id. at 1160, 1162. 
 148 See Zarsky, supra note 123, at 768–69 (noting that social networks are powerful tools for 
distributing broadcast media content); see, e.g., Hope140, TWITTER HOPE140, http://hope140. 
org/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2011) (providing visitors with links to donate to several 
humanitarian causes and organizations); Jolie O’Dell, Twitter Starts Running Political Ads for 
2012 Campaign, SOCIALBEAT (Sept. 21, 2011), http://venturebeat.com/2011/09/21/twitter-
political-ads/ (offering campaign advertisements and explaining Twitter’s role in last U.S. 
election). 
 149 See Zarsky, supra note 123, at 765, 768–69 (noting that addition of social network sites 
limits media market’s ability to exercise bottleneck control on information flows). 
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redistribution of media content and facilitating non-media generated public 
discourse, social network sites serve as a sort of check valve that channels 
the collective voice of societies for social and even governmental change.150  
Perhaps the most sweeping example of the check valve function is the 
phenomenon known as the “Arab Spring” in which social media was largely 
credited with facilitating protests and social outcries that toppled 
dictatorships.151  This extremely brief overview of social network structure, 
privacy concerns, and beneficial uses is meant to create a frame through 
which to check the strength or weakness of regulating social network sites as 
a method of resolving the U.K.’s privacy injunction problems. 
V.  REMEDYING THE NETWORK INDUCED PRIVACY BREACH 
Several possible solutions to social network privacy issues exist: direct 
regulation, self-regulation, and social management.152  But none of these is 
adequate to solve the U.K.’s injunction breach issues.  As will be explained 
below, neither the external nor internal regulation of social network sites 
seems likely to alleviate the privacy-infringing behavior that followed in the 
wake of the CTB injunction.  To understand why merely requires a look back 
to the prior discussion regarding the nature and types of social network 
privacy infringement. 
A.  Why Social Network Regulation Fails 
Whether regulating social network sites is of any benefit is partially 
dependent on the category of infringement (provider-based or peer-to-peer) 
into which the Giggs debacle falls.  The factual pattern falls into the peer-to-
peer category because Twitter did not breach the privacy injunction directly, 
serving instead as the platform by which individual users chose to ignore the 
injunction and post information about Giggs’s identity.  Indeed, Twitter 
cooperated with authorities to identify infringing users.153  Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                   
 150 See id. at 768 (discussing social network sites as tool for generating public discourse). 
 151 Raymond Schillinger, Social Media and the Arab Spring: What Have We Learned?, 
HUFFPOST WORLD BLOG (Sept. 20, 2011 3:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/raymon d-
schillinger/arab-spring-social-media_b_970165.html (noting credit given to social media for 
fomenting change as well as sentiment that social media shifted the “balance of power from 
nation-states to individuals . . . .”). 
 152 See Grimmelmann, supra note 18, at 1195 (suggesting a socially oriented solution); 
David Raj Nijhawan, Note, The Emperor Has No Clothes: A Critique of Applying the 
European Union Approach to Privacy Regulation in the United States, 56 VAND. L. REV. 939, 
941 (2003) (discussing differing methods of treatment in U.S. and E.U.). 
 153 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
2012] DEATH BY BIRDSONG 209 
 
Giggs did not post private information online and later expect it to remain so; 
rather, he conducted an affair in private and took steps to keep it private.154  
Twitter users discovered information that Giggs and the U.K. court deemed 
private and divulged it to the online community, thus placing culpability on 
network site users rather than providers. 
Keeping the culpable actors in mind, turn now to the first possible 
solution: direct regulation of social network sites.  European democracies 
tend to put a high value on protection of private, user-generated information, 
and many have already implemented national or transnational regimes for 
monitoring and enforcing online privacy protection.155  Britain could attempt 
to strengthen its own Data Protection Act156 and force sites like Twitter to 
better police themselves.  However, we need not look too far down this path 
because it is an exercise in futility.  Under the current facts it appears that 
Twitter is not directly infringing Giggs’s privacy; the ability for users to 
infringe on one another’s private information is an unintended consequence 
of the social network structure.  If users are the problem then current data 
protection regulation is not primed to address the problem as most data 
protection regulation is designed to protect individuals from governmental or 
private sector infringement.157  Further it is irrational to expect network 
providers to accurately anticipate privacy breaches of this nature when, under 
Professor Grimmelmann’s disagreement category of peer-to-peer harms, 
even users are not always able to discern what will or will not be considered 
private.158  Twitter is a medium for third-party communication and lacks ex 
ante control over the content posted by its users, despite recent innovations 
that appear to signal the contrary.  In early 2012, Twitter introduced a micro-
censorship system designed to withhold posts in countries that find 
designated content unacceptable.159  Upon notice to Twitter, any material 
deemed unfit under the laws of a specific county will be censored and a 
message stating, “This Tweet from @Username has been withheld in: 
Country,” will replace the content of that post for all users within the 
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designated country.160  At first glance this suggests a technical solution to 
online privacy issues.  For example, the U.K. need only inform Twitter that 
content related to the CTB injunction cannot legally be posted and Twitter 
will withhold related content.  Still there are several aspects of the censorship 
system and privacy that suggest this is not yet a viable solution, though it 
may be a step in the right direction.  First, this system is not specifically 
designed with privacy in mind, rather it encompasses broader concerns a 
country might have with posted content that is critical of government or 
quoted text from banned literature.161  Adapting the process for enjoined 
private information may be somewhat difficult to balance with the rights of 
free expression.  In a post of 140 characters or less, the limiting terms needed 
to cover the restricted circumstance may have to be so broad that they also 
prohibit innocent comments about the individuals, which may also have the 
unfortunate effect of confirming or revealing information by negative 
implication. 
Second, the system does not appear to eliminate preexisting or new posts 
that do not conform to a country’s legal requirements; Twitter describes the 
system as “reactively withhold[ing] access to certain content in a particular 
country.”162  This suggests that the material is not deleted but automatically 
masked from users in the countries that prohibit its dissemination.163  Further 
supporting this interpretation is the technical bypass that allows a user whose 
country is ostensibly misidentified to “correct” Twitter by changing their 
individual settings to those of another country.164  The apparent result is that 
content previously identified as withheld from their account becomes 
visible.165 
For now, the best social network sites can do is correct breaches as they 
are made known, which Twitter attempted to do by cooperating with Giggs 
and authorities.166  The fact remains that even if they use micro-censorship, 
social network providers are not clairvoyant.  To identify protected 
information and attempt to stop any online breach via their site would require 
governments to make social network sites aware of the content of every 
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injunction so that the site could create an adequate automated censor.  That 
measure may not be acceptable to injunction claimants and more importantly 
may create more potential privacy leaks.  Social networks can neither 
determine the various ways in which privacy rights may be infringed nor the 
content that individuals will consider private. 
Another concern is that too much direct regulation could have a chilling 
effect on social network sites sufficient to destroy them altogether.167  This 
could be a very negative outcome because of the many beneficial uses social 
network sites permit, chief of which is the growing social and political 
check-valve function credited with facilitating sweeping regime changes in 
the Middle East.168  Direct regulation also has the potential to exacerbate the 
privacy problem since users have a tendency to retaliate when regulations bar 
them from doing what they want.169  As noted earlier, Twitter users displayed 
just such a negative reaction when Giggs began taking legal action against 
their peers, leading to greater privacy exposure.170  Ultimately, direct 
regulation does not seem to address the heart of the CTB privacy breach and 
may cause more trouble than is worthwhile. 
The next possible solution would, in a sense, ignore the problem.  Self-
regulation is a method by which the British government would permit social 
network sites, as an industry, to determine their own standards for privacy 
and rely on market forces to sort out the level of privacy infringement users 
are willing to deal with.171  This too appears to be an inadequate solution.  
First, many users do not consider the privacy breach following Giggs’s 
injunction to be a privacy infringement at all, as evidenced by their 
reactions.172  Thus, it seems that many users believe the true infringement is 
against the right of free expression and Giggs has no right to suppress the 
information.  Thus, if a self-regulatory scheme relies on users to let providers 
know what level of privacy is acceptable, then it is possible that privacy 
infringements like the one experienced by Giggs will go unaddressed by the 
industry.  There simply would not be enough user complaints. 
Second, even assuming user outcry was sufficient to galvanize action by 
site providers, society cannot ensure that the privacy policies and technical 
settings generated by a self-regulatory scheme would be able to address the 
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particularized form of privacy harm suggested by cases like Giggs’s.  
Policies and settings are designed to make users aware of how their 
information is used and to give them greater control of what information is 
disseminated on a site once that information is posted.  But these measures 
rely heavily on one of two scenarios: the information was posted by (1) the 
user who is the subject of that information or (2) a user who is in the 
subject’s network.  Either case should provide the network links necessary 
for user settings to limit the dissemination of information.  However, neither 
instance is representative of Giggs’s case.  He did not voluntarily post 
information regarding the affair to Twitter nor was he networked to those 
users who did, at least not in any way that would provide warning or permit 
him to advantageously use network settings.  In the end it is as Professor 
Grimmelmann posits: the problem is with users.173 
What are legislators to do about such user infringement?  As Mr. 
Hemming noted, it would be an impossible task to imprison all the 
responsible Twitter users.174  It is certainly possible to pursue individuals for 
monetary damages like members of the music industry pursued individuals 
for copyright violations stemming from file sharing.175  However, that does 
little to help regulators prevent violations, which is arguably what individuals 
seeking privacy injunctions want most.  Unlike copyright, whose criteria for 
identifying violations makes it predictable, privacy varies because of 
individual preferences and a lack of preexisting criteria identifying what 
information is private.176   
One of Professor Grimmelmann’s final suggestions is that users be 
educated on their privacy-affecting behaviors.177  He suggests drawing on 
culturally and socially relevant norms to reach those groups at risk of 
perpetrating and falling victim to privacy infringement.178  While this is not a 
legal argument per se, it may present the best option in Giggs’s case, at least 
in the sense that it points the analysis back to Parliament’s best legal options.  
What the professor’s argument suggests is that regulation of social network 
sites is inadequate to limit privacy risks because the user element continues 
to contribute to those risks independent of the social network site’s actions.  
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Sites are but the medium for the users’ messages.  Thus, the broader 
implication to be drawn is that where management of the social network 
service fails, management of the inputs or sources of information for that site 
may succeed because users require information in order to post on a social 
network site.  They need something to talk about. 
Users may be one direct source of information when they draw on their 
experiences as source material.  In addition to users, the news media is a 
source of information with fairly strong ties to social networks, not only 
providing information users could link back to a privacy claimant like Giggs 
but also encouraging the dissemination of that information through social 
networks via links in each story.  In his case it may even be that members of 
the media intentionally released information they knew was granted legal 
protection by the court or, at the very least, encouraged others to knowingly 
disseminate that information across their personal networks.179  When 
Thomas came forward with her story, the media acquired a measure of 
control over the release of that information.  Before that story could be 
published, the claimant obtained an injunction meant to protect his identity, 
but elements within the news media apparently made deliberate attempts to 
leak it anyway.  The essential point is that media control and dissemination 
of private information were precursors to the wide-scale privacy breach that 
occurred via Twitter.  Viewed in this way the CTB debacle can be 
characterized as another blow in an ongoing struggle between the U.K.’s 
judiciary and the news media over the true implications of the HRA. 
Therefore, Parliament may not need to overly concern itself with Twitter.  
The question shifts from determining whether parliamentarians can regulate 
Twitter or Twitter users directly, to whether they can effectively regulate the 
news media in its capacity as an information source for social network sites.  
To properly address that question, Parliament must take legislative action to 
clarify the balance between the competing rights of Article 8 privacy and 
Article 10 free expression.180 
B.  Balancing in Favor of a Free Press 
Begin with the easiest argument: to solve the looming privacy issues, 
Parliament should “beef up the press watchdog.”181  It could do so by 
providing sweeping definitions for “public figures” and the “public interest” 
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that would encompass celebrities and celebrity lifestyles.  This may seem too 
simplistic at first, but recall that according to ECHR Article 8 the 
individual’s right to privacy only governs to the extent that the information is 
not deemed “necessary . . .[to] the interests of national security, public safety 
or . . . for the protection of health and morals . . . .”182  This concept was 
referred to previously as the public interest exception to Article 8.183  Thus, if 
celebrity affairs or lifestyles in general were swept into the definition of the 
public interest, then celebrities would have no reasonable expectation of 
privacy and thus no right to Article 8 protection regarding whatever matter 
has been brought to light.184  At the very least, a rash of potential super-
injunction cases and appeals could be avoided by allowing the media to 
report on matters that have become so prevalent on social network sites that 
they are well known anyway.  Although this seems like a fair outcome on its 
face, it relies on two invalid assumptions: (1) social network sites have little 
discernible effect on the balance of ECHR rights, and (2) to the degree social 
network sites may affect the balance of rights, free expression, and thus the 
news media, are somehow the ones most harmed.  
That the existence of social network sites affects the balance of privacy 
and free expression cannot be denied.  They are a form of media not 
anticipated by the system proposed in the ECHR, which was created in 1950 
(well before the rise of social network sites), and adopted by the HRA.185  
Though the balance of rights was intended to inure in the favor of free 
expression, as evidenced by reference to the weighted balancing test,186 the 
rise of social network sites gives free expression a technical advantage over 
the privacy right.  The advantage flows from the speed of information 
dissemination that results from a network structure and from the near 
impossibility of determining what a given user is going to post from moment 
to moment.  It is inherently difficult for individuals to hold onto private 
matters known by individuals with network access because each individual is 
able to spread that information widely. 
The second false assumption is that the news media are innocent victims 
of the seemingly unstoppable growth of the social network site, a perception 
reinforced by NGN’s appeal following the release of Giggs’s identity via 
Twitter.  Though the social network site may discourage reliance on printed 
news, it is not an entirely separate form of media encroaching on the 
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hallowed grounds of the press.  As noted earlier, news sites provide links to 
multiple social network sites within a given story, practically begging readers 
to re-post information and disseminate it to their network of contacts.187  In 
this sense social network sites act as extensions of the news media, providing 
valuable advertisement and drawing in a larger audience.   
Finally, although it is futile to guess whether any were aware of the full 
impact that Twitter would have on the events following the CTB injunction, 
evidence of so-called jigsaw identification and other journalistic practices 
suggest that at least some within the news media were complicit in the 
breach of privacy injunctions.  Justice Eady acknowledged this likelihood in 
the first appeal when commenting on the widespread attempts to render the 
injunction ineffective.188  Thus, the existence of social networks conceivably 
gives the free expression right an unanticipated advantage over the individual 
privacy right far in excess of what was intended by lawmakers.  
Strengthening the press’s investigative power would create a further 
imbalance between the rights in Articles 8 and 10 by granting freedom of 
expression a level of power that is not within the spirit of the ECHR.  If the 
U.K. wishes to uphold the standards that it adopted when the HRA was 
signed into law, it must legislate with an eye to rebalancing the system in 
favor of privacy rights. 
C.  Rebalance: Salvaging the Right of Privacy 
The course of action that seems to most conform to ECHR standards is 
for Parliament to provide for stronger regulation of the press.  By better 
controlling the sources from which social network users obtain information, 
legislators may be able to limit access to some private information thus 
alleviating certain forms of privacy infractions, particularly those similar to 
what Giggs experienced.  One way to better regulate the press would be for 
Parliament to alter the definition of “public figure” to directly exclude 
celebrities and their lives while leaving the “public interest” definition 
unaltered.  This would mean that as a matter of law the press could not report 
a story merely because one or more of the subjects have celebrity status.  
This is not, however, a complete bar on reporting celebrity stories.  
Preserving the definition of public interest would permit the press to report 
matters in which the celebrity was clearly acting in a manner influencing the 
operation of democratic society.  However, the onus would be on journalists 
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to preliminarily ensure either newsworthiness or a privacy waiver by the 
subject. 
Legislative models excluding celebrity status from the public interest are 
not new to European nations; Sweden relies on a self-regulatory agency 
called the Swedish Press Council to police news articles and ensure that 
individual privacy protection standards are met.189  According to members of 
the Swedish press, the industry, not the legislators, defines public figure 
narrowly to exclude celebrities altogether.190  Thus, in Sweden’s case there is 
no legislation on the books requiring a narrow definition.  For the U.K. press, 
this would mean that stories regarding celebrities should be excluded from 
reports unless the individuals involved consented or unless the subject matter 
itself is clearly in public interest, such as criminal activity or acts 
substantially similar in effect to those performed by public figures.191  
Waiver is not limited to consent.  It also includes actions by a celebrity that 
directly place the subject matter into the public domain.192  One example 
would be if a celebrity personally posted subject matter on a social network 
site prior to seeking injunction.   
Clearly writing celebrities out of public figure status, as considered under 
the ECHR, should appropriately restore the Article 8 privacy right to its 
position in the human rights balance.  It would permit infringement of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy only when the proper function of 
democratic society is significantly influenced by that private information.193  
Affairs and other private details of a celebrity’s life would have much the 
same protections as the private matters of an average citizen. 
Some might contend that, by injecting themselves into stardom, 
celebrities should know they are watched by many and thus should not 
expect the same level of privacy as average citizens.  That is true, but in a 
variation on Justice Tugendhat’s reasoning we might say the very fact that 
celebrities have less privacy suggests that those matters that can remain 
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private without hindering their work or the nation should be zealously 
protected.194  However, a question still remains as to exactly how much 
regulatory action Parliament must take to facilitate this rebalancing. 
The Swedish self-regulatory system suggests that the press is capable of 
handling itself.  The Swedish Press Council has broad power to levy fines 
and other forms of punishment for a violation of its standards.195  Perhaps 
Parliament need only establish a press agency with sufficient power to 
regulate and punish its own.  Self-regulation would be the least invasive, and 
likely the least stressful, action Parliament could take.  However, it has 
already been attempted. 
The U.K.’s Press Complaints Commission (PCC) was formed in the early 
1990s to replace the then existent self-regulatory body, the Press Council.196  
The PCC lacks the enforcement powers available to the Swedish Press 
Council (SPC) as well as many of the protections afforded to journalists 
under SPC; the result appears to be that the PCC has used much of its 
influence to avoid further press regulation, rather than to uphold individual 
privacy.197  It certainly did little of import during the CTB debacle. 
Therefore, Parliament will likely have to take a direct role in defining the 
acceptable standards of press reports and should, at the very least, proceed to 
adjust the scope of the public interest exception to clearly exclude celebrities 
from the definition of public figures.  Parliament can delegate some 
responsibility to the PCC or to another regulatory agency that is 
representative of journalists and the news industry, but that delegation must 
include a grant of enforcement power sufficient for the agency to act 
independently.  There is one concern that would be relieved whether 
Parliament chooses to take a more active role in regulation or to sanction a 
fully self-regulatory scheme: judicial law making. 
One of the key concerns with the HRA and judicial interpretation of the 
ECHR was a fear that the judicial branch would usurp parliamentary 
functions by crafting and enforcing a new privacy law without parliamentary 
consent.198  If Parliament moves to strengthen privacy protection or charges 
the media to do so, the specter of a rogue judiciary would have less cause to 
haunt the public mind.  Given the prior record of press self-regulation in the 
U.K., however, Parliament likely needs to exercise a greater degree of 
oversight than is present in the Swedish model until such time as the press 
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industry demonstrates the ability to monitor and enforce compliance on its 
own. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
When the words “privacy,” “regulation,” and “social network” are used in 
such close proximity, they may conjure images of cybernetic beings 
proclaiming the ultimate futility of resistance—at least for those stricken by 
the science fiction bug.  Regulators have a daunting task whenever 
confronted by social network problems, thus Chairman Whittingdale’s 
concerns do bear merit.  The suggestion that better regulation of the news 
media may be a solution to the privacy ills of some celebrities opens the door 
to an indirect method of dealing with some social network privacy issues.  
By managing the sources that supply social-network-site users with 
information, Parliament may be able to reduce the instances of privacy 
violation and the caseload stemming from such violations.  An alternative to 
increased stricture on the news media is to actually increase their 
investigative powers, thereby cutting off the legal basis for complaints.  But 
in the U.K. and other state parties to the ECHR, this option conforms 
significantly less to the principles of the Convention, turning what was meant 
to be a balance of individual and public rights into a one-sided media affair. 
